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Abstract 
 
We model a timing game of bubbles and crashes a la Abreu and Brunnermeier 
(2003), in which arbitrageurs compete with each other to beat the gun in a stock market. 
However, unlike Abreu and Brunnermeier, instead of assuming sequential awareness, 
the present paper assumes that with a small probability, each arbitrageur is behavioral 
and committed to ride the bubble at all times. We show that with incomplete 
information, even rational arbitrageurs are willing to ride the bubble. In particular, the 
bubble can persist for a long period as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. 
 
Keywords: Bubbles and Crashes, Timing Games, Behavioral Arbitrageurs, Positive 
Feedback Traders, Reputation, Characterization, Uniqueness 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation underlying the willingness of 
rational arbitrageurs to ride the bubble in a stock market. We model the stock market as 
a timing game with incomplete information among arbitrageurs; the model is inspired 
by that of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
3 However, our model does not require the 
assumption of sequential awareness that has played a central role in the above paper. 
Instead, we assume that each arbitrageur is not necessarily rational, i.e., he is behavioral 
with a small probability, in that he is committed to ride the bubble at all times. With the 
assumption of incomplete information, the present paper shows that even rational 
arbitrageurs are willing to ride the bubble for a long period. 
The efficient market hypothesis in modern financial theory asserts that by 
reflecting all relevant information, the stock price is always adjusted to the fundamental 
value. However, there are considerable evidences that contradict this hypothesis: the 
stock price sometimes increases beyond the fundamental value and continues to 
increase until it goes into a free fall. Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shleifer 
(2000) and Shiller (2000), argued that the bubble is driven by positive feedback traders, 
who incorrectly believe that the stock price will grow in perpetuity. The efficient market 
hypothesis, on the other hand, claims that rational arbitrageurs quickly undo this 
mispricing. The arbitrageurs’ selling pressures then dampen the enthusiasm of the 
positive feedback traders, immediately bursting the bubble. 
In contrast to this ideal of rational arbitrageurs, actual professional arbitrageurs 
who are mostly considered to be rational generally do not think that the best strategy is 
                                                 
3  See also Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) and Brunnermeier and Morgan (2006).   4
to undo mispricing in this manner; instead, they would like to ride the bubble. On the 
basis of historical experiences, several authors such as Kindleberger (1978) and Soros 
(1994) even emphasized a self-feeding aspect of bubbles and crashes: speculative price 
movements involve multiple professional arbitrageurs who continuously drive the stock 
price up and then sell out at the top to the positive feedback traders. 
However, we may disagree with this view, because the arbitrageurs may compete 
with each other in order to exit the market by selling out, i.e., beat the gun or time the 
market at the earliest. This phenomenon along with the backward induction method 
prevents the persistence of a bubble. Hence, in order for this view to be convincing, we 
need to demonstrate a further theoretical foundation, based on which each rational 
arbitrageur is willing to terminate this chain reaction of competition and develop a 
reputation among them to ride the bubble. 
On the basis of these arguments, the present paper models the stock market as a 
timing game, where the stock market operates during the time interval  [0,1], and each 
arbitrageur selects a time to exit the market by selling out his share. As long as no 
arbitrageur has sold out, the bubble continues to be driven by the positive feedback 
traders. Once any arbitrageur sells out, the other arbitrageurs vie with each other to 
follow in the footsteps of this arbitrageur. As soon as their selling pressures exceed a 
critical amount of shares, the positive feedback traders fail to support the stock price, 
and then the bubble crashes. 
The key assumption of this paper is that every arbitrageur is not necessarily 
rational. With a small probability, he is behavioral and committed to ride the bubble at 
all times. We also assume incomplete information, in that whether each arbitrageur is 
behavioral or rational is unknown to the other arbitrageurs. On witnessing the   5
persistence of a bubble, each rational arbitrageur is increasingly convinced that the other 
arbitrageurs are behavioral, which incentivizes him to further postpone timing the 
market. On the basis of this reasoning, each arbitrageur is convinced in the early stage 
of the timing game that the other arbitrageurs are subject to ride the bubble for a long 
period, even if they are rational. 
In this respect, we should mention the relevance to the reputation theory in finitely 
repeated games with incomplete information explored by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and 
Wilson (1982). With the assumption of incomplete information on whether players are 
rational or crazy enough to have blind faith in implicit collusion, any rational player is 
willing to mimic the crazy players’ collusive behavior. The present paper will apply the 
basic concept of this theory to the timing games of bubbles and crashes. 
With restrictions that the growth rate of a bubble and the probability of each 
arbitrageur’s being behavioral are not very small, it is shown that there exists the unique 
Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is symmetric and is named the bubble-crash 
equilibrium, where a particular point of critical time  ˆ (0,1) τ ∈  exists, such that (i) the 
bubble never crashes before the critical time  ˆ τ , whereas (ii) after the critical time  ˆ τ , 
the time at which the bubble crashes is randomly determined according to a constant 
hazard rate. This hazard rate is very high when the ratio between the total amount of 
shares that the arbitrageurs possess and the critical amount of share is close to unity; in 
this case, the bubble can persist for a long period, even if all arbitrageurs are almost 
certain from the beginning that the bubble will crash just around a particular fixed time. 
Without these restrictions, another symmetric Nash equilibrium may exist, which 
is named the quick-crash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, any rational arbitrageur 
certainly sells out at the initial time, and therefore, the bubble never persists, except for   6
the case in which all arbitrageurs are behavioral. The present paper provides a general 
characterization of all symmetric Nash equilibria. This characterization implies that 
whenever the bubble-crash and quick-crash equilibria coexist, there also exists another 
symmetric Nash equilibrium named the hybrid equilibrium. In it, each rational 
arbitrageur randomizes between the quick-crash equilibrium strategy and a modified 
version of the bubble-crash equilibrium strategy. In general, there exists no other 
symmetric Nash equilibrium apart from the bubble-crash, quick-crash, and hybrid 
equilibria. 
There exist previous works that identified conditions under which the bubble exists 
(see the survey by Brunnermeier (2008)). Among these works, the paper by Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003) is particularly relevant to the present paper. This paper modeled 
the stock market as a timing game similar to ours, and was the first to present a 
theoretical background that explained that the resilience of the bubble stems from the 
inability of arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies. Abreu and Brunnermeier 
assumed that the arbitrageurs become sequentially aware that the bubble has developed. 
Instead of this sequential awareness, the present paper assumes that each arbitrageur is 
not necessarily rational and provides an alternative explanation with regard to the 
inability of arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies, mainly because they use 
mixed strategies. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines timing games of 
bubbles and crashes, and Section 3 investigates the quick-crash equilibrium. In Section 
4, we investigate the bubble-crash equilibrium. Section 5 investigates the hybrid 
equilibria, and Section 6 characterizes all symmetric Nash equilibria. In Section 7, we 
show a sufficient condition under which the bubble-crash equilibrium is the unique   7
Nash equilibrium, where we take into account all asymmetric Nash equilibria. Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
This paper considers the trade in a company’s shares during the time interval  [0,1]. 
The fundamental value of this company is considered to be  0 y ≥ . We assume that the 
market interest rate is set equal to zero and no dividends are paid. There exist  2 n ≥  
arbitrageurs, each of whom decides the time to sell out his stockholding that is 
normalized to a single share. Let  {1,..., } Nn =   denote the set of arbitrageurs. 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical pattern of bubbles and crashes. At the initial time 0, 
the arbitrageurs recognize that the bubble has occurred, where the stock price is set 
equal to  1 y + . The bubble persists as long as at most  1 n −    arbitrageurs have sold out 
their shares, where  n    is a fixed positive integer and  nn <  . The difference between the 
stock price and the fundamental value grows exponentially according to a constant rate 
0 ρ > ; the stock price per share is considered to be 
t ey





Once any arbitrageur sells out his share, this selling pressure triggers all the other 
arbitrageurs to sell out immediately, which bursts the bubble because their collective 
                                                 
4 Unlike Abreu and Brunnermeier, not the absolute value of the stock price but the distance 
from the fundamental value grows exponentially.   8
selling pressure exceeds the critical amount of shares  n  . We assume that even if no 
arbitrageur sells out at or before the terminal time 1, the bubble crashes just after the 
terminal time for exogenous reasons.
5 
Against the abovementioned background, it is implicit to assume the presence of 
many positive feedback traders who have psychological biases that lead them to engage 
in momentum trading. They incorrectly believe that the stock price will grow in 
perpetuity and attempt to support the high stock price. The moment n   or more 
arbitrageurs sell out their shares, the positive feedback traders fail to support the stock 
price, which causes it to decline to the fundamental value  y . In this respect, like Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and Brunnermeier and Morgan (2006),
6 our dynamic 
model shares aspects of coordinated attacks with the static models of currency attacks 
in international finance, such as Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998). These 
models assumed the necessity of speculators’ coordination to break a currency peg.
7 
                                                 
5 This paper assumes that short selling is prohibited. Without this assumption, any single 
arbitrageur can burst the bubble alone; this case is essentially the same as the case of  1 n =  , 
where the critical amount of shares equals one. Even in this case, we could show that the bubble 
may survive; however, this possibility is significantly limited. 
6 Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) assumed that whether or not each arbitrageur has sold 
out is unobservable to the other arbitrageurs, whereas Brunnermeier and Morgan (2006) 
assumed that it is observable and all arbitrageurs rush to sell out once any arbitrageur times the 
market. The present paper follows Brunnermeier and Morgan. However, by adding irrelevant 
complexities, we can apply the basic concept of this paper to the case in which arbitrageurs’ 
transactions are observable, and endogenize the assumption of their rushing in the same manner 
as Brunnermeier and Morgan. 
7  It might be helpful to think about the game of “musical chairs” as a metaphor for our model: 
there exist n  players and n   chairs that are arranged in a circle, where nn <  , i.e., the 
number of chairs is less than the number of players. Each player has a whistle in his mouth. 
Music starts at the initial time 0. While the music is playing, the players walk in unison around   9
On the basis of the above arguments, we define a strategy for each arbitrageur 
iN ∈  as a cumulative distribution  :[0,1] [0,1] i q →  that is nondecreasing, right 
continuous, and satisfies  0 ()1 i q τ = . Following any strategy  i q , arbitrageur  i plans to 
sell out at or before any time  [0,1] i a ∈  with the probability of  ( ) [0,1] ii qa∈ . Let  i Q  
denote the set of strategies for arbitrageur i.We will consider  ii qa =  to be a pure 
strategy if 
() 0 i q τ =  for  all  [0, ) i a τ ∈ , and  ( ) 1 i q τ =  for  all  0 [,] i a τ τ ∈ . 
Significantly, this paper assumes that any arbitrageur iN ∈  is not necessarily 
rational, and therefore, does not necessarily follow any strategy in the set  i Q . Let us fix 
any arbitrary real number  [0,1] ε ∈ . With regard to the probability of  ε , arbitrageur  i 
is behavioral, in that he is committed to ride the bubble, i.e., sell out just after any other 
arbitrageur first sells out. Hence, any such behavioral arbitrageur does not trigger the 
burst of the bubble of his own accord. With regard to the remaining probability of  1 ε − , 
arbitrageur  i is rational, and follows any strategy in  i Q . Whether each arbitrageur is 
behavioral or rational is independently determined and is not common knowledge 
among the arbitrageurs. In other words, each arbitrageur does not know whether the 
other arbitrageurs are rational or behavioral. 
Suppose that each arbitrageur iN ∈  plans to sell out at time  [0,1] i a ∈ . Let us 
                                                                                                                                               
the chairs. When a player blows the whistle, the music is immediately shut off, and then every 
player must race to sit down in one of the chairs. The  n   players who could sit down are 
regarded as the winners; each winner obtains 
t ey
ρ +  dollars, while any loser obtains  y  
dollars, provided some player blew the whistle and the music was shut off at time  [0,1] t∈ . 
Even if no player blows the whistle, the music is automatically shut off at the terminal time 1. 
By assuming that any player who blows the whistle has the advantage of rushing for a seat, we 
can regard this game as being the same as our model.   10
arbitrarily set any nonempty subset of arbitrageurs  HN ⊂ , and let us suppose that any 
arbitrageur  iH ∈  is rational, while any arbitrageur  \ iN H ∈  is behavioral. Note that 
any behavioral arbitrageur  \ iN H ∈  never sells out at his planned time  i a ; he is 
instead committed to wait for any other arbitrageur to time the market. Let us denote by 
[0,1] τ ∈  the time at which any rational arbitrageur sells out first, which is defined as 
the earliest time at which the rational arbitrageurs plan to sell out, i.e., 
min{ | } i ai H τ =∈ . 
Let  {1,..., } lH ∈  denote the number of rational arbitrageurs who plans to sell out at 
this earliest time  τ , i.e., 
{|} i li H a τ =∈ = . 




, any rational arbitrageur  iH ∈  who plans to 
sell out at time τ  sells out before the crash of the bubble, and earns  ey
ρτ + . With 





, he fails to sell out before the crash and 
earns only the fundamental value  y . 
If  ln ≤ , then he certainly sells out before the crash. In this case,  nl −   further 
arbitrageurs can sell out before the crash. Hence, even any arbitrageur who either is 
behavioral or plans to sell out after time τ  has the opportunity to sell out before the 








On the basis of these observations, we define the expected earning of any rational 
                                                 
8  It is implicit to assume that the behavioral arbitrageurs have the following advantage over the 
positive feedback traders: the behavioral arbitrageurs can sell out immediately after some 
rational arbitrageur times the market, while the positive feedback traders cannot sell out until 
the stock price declines to the fundamental value.   11
arbitrageur  iH ∈  by 




ρτ =+    if  i a τ = , 
and 






=+  if i a τ > . 
Let  1 n QQ Q =× ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ×, and let  1 ( ,..., ) n qq q Q =∈  denote a strategy profile. The payoff 
function : i uQ R →  for each arbitrageur iN ∈  is defined as follows. For every 
qQ ∈ , let us specify  ( ) i uq  as being equal to the expected value of  ( , ) i vHa in terms 
of ( , ) aH, i.e., 
1
:




uq E vHa q εε
−−
⊂∈
≡− ∑ . 
A strategy profile  qQ ∈   is said to be a Nash equilibrium if 
() ( , ) ii i i uq uqq − ′ ≥  for  all iN ∈  and  all  ii qQ ′∈ . 
A strategy profile  qQ ∈   is said to be symmetric if  1 i qq =  for  all iN ∈ . 
Let us introduce several notations as follows. For each strategy profile  qQ ∈ , let 
us denote the probability that the bubble has crashed at or before any time  [0,1] t∈  by 
   (; ) 1 [ ( 1 ) { 1 () } ] i
iN
Dtq q t εε
∈
≡− + − − ∏ . 
Note that  (1; ) 1 1
n Dq ε ≡− < whenever  0 ε > , which implies that the bubble does not 
necessarily crash during the time interval of [0,1], because it is with the positive 
probability of  0
n ε >   that all arbitrageurs are behavioral. Let us define the hazard rate 












Moreover, for each arbitrageur  iN ∈  and each strategy profile  qQ ∈ , let us denote 
the probability that the bubble has crashed at or before any time  t, provided arbitrageur   12
i  never bursts the bubble of his own accord, by 
\{ }
(; ) 1 [ ( 1 ) { 1 () } ] ii j
jN i
Dtq qt εε −
∈
=− + − − ∏ . 
 
 
3. Quick-Crash Equilibrium 
 
We denote by 
* (0,...,0) q ≡   the symmetric strategy profile, named the quick-crash 
strategy profile, according to which any rational arbitrageur plans to sell out at the 
initial time 0. Hence, according to 
* q , the bubble quickly crashes at the initial time 0. 
Figure 2 illustrates 
* (; ) Dtq , which is kept equal to a constant value of  1




Proposition 1: The quick-crash strategy profile 





(1 ) {min[1, ] max[0, ]}




















− ≥− . 
 




() ( 1 ) m i n [ 1 , ]
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1 i a n ey
ρ ε
− ++ . 
Hence, for every  (0,1] i a ∈ , 




(1 ) {min[1, ] max[0, }

















i a n e
ρ ε
− +− . 
From 
i a ee
ρ ρ ≥  for all  (0,1] i a ∈ , and from the above observations, it follows that the 
inequality of (1) is necessary and sufficient for 
* q   to be a Nash equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
      
 Note  that 
* q  is a Nash equilibrium if  0 ε = , i.e., it is certain that all arbitrageurs 
are rational. In this case, the left-hand side of (1) equals zero, while its right-hand side 





, which automatically implies the inequality of (1). The assumption 
of  0 ε =  also implies the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium; any rational arbitrageur 
dislikes losing the opportunity to become the single winner of the timing game. This 
presses him to hasten the time to beat the gun slightly earlier than the others. This aspect 
of tail-chasing competition eliminates all equilibria other than 
* q . 
  This logic, however, cannot be applied to the case of  0 ε > . Even if any arbitrageur 
plans to sell out at the terminal time 1, he still has the opportunity of becoming the 
single winner with regard to the positive probability of  0
n ε > ; the assumption of 
0 ε >   may apply the brakes to their tail-chasing competition. The rest of this paper will 
focus on the case of  0 ε > . 
   14
4. Bubble-Crash Equilibrium 
 
This section specifies a symmetric strategy profile  ( ) iiN qq Q ∈ = ∈  , named the 
bubble-crash strategy profile, according to which the bubble persists for a long period. 
Let us suppose that the growth rate of a bubble  0 ρ >  and the probability of each 
arbitrageur being behavioral  (0,1) ε ∈  satisfies 













which implies that ρ  and ε  are not very small. Let us define a particular time 
[0,1) τ ∈   by 










where the inequality of (2) guarantees  [0,1) τ ∈  . We specify the bubble-crash strategy 
profile  q    as follows: for every  iN ∈ , 
()0 ii qa =   for  all  [0, ) i a τ ∈  , 
and 
















   for  all  [ ,1] i a τ ∈  . 
Note from (3) that  ( ) 0 i q τ =  , which implies that  i q   is continuous. According to  q  , 
the bubble never crashes before the specified time  τ . The following theorem states that 
q    is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 2: With the inequality of (2), the bubble-crash strategy profile  q   is a Nash 
equilibrium, and 
(5)     ()
nn
i uq e y
ρ ε
− =+
  .   15
 
Proof: Since the bubble never crashes before the time  τ , it follows from the continuity 
of  q   that 
(, )
i a
ii i uaq e y
ρ
− =+   for  all  [0, ) i a τ ∈  . 
Since  q    is continuous, it follows 
    (, ) ( , ) ii i i i uq e y u a q
ρτ τ −− =+ >
    for  all  ˆ [0, ) i a τ ∈ . 
For every  [ ,1] i a τ ∈  , 
   
1






ii i ii i i i
t
n











  . 
The specification of  q   implies 
    ( ; ) 0 ii Dtq − =   for  all  [0, ) t τ ∈  , 
and 
(6)    
1









− =−    for  all  [ ,1] t τ ∈  . 
From (6), the following first-order conditions hold for all  [ ,1] i a τ ∈  : 
(7)    
1






ii i ii i i i
ii t
n











   
   
1( ; )
{1 ( ; )} (1 )
1















{1 ( ; )}
1
ii aa ii i
ii i
i
nn D a q

















a aa n ii i nn
i










where, from (6), we have derived 
1
(1 ) 1 (; ) 1 i
n














which implies the last equality of (7). Hence, we have proved that   16
(, ) ( , ) ii i i i uq u a q τ −− =    for  all  [ ,1] i a τ ∈  . 
From the above arguments, we have proved that  q    is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
() ( , ) ii i i uq uqq − ≥   for  all  ii qQ ∈ . 
From (3), 
    (, )
nn
ii uq e y ey
ρτ ρ τε
−
− =+ = +
  , 
which along with  ( ) ( , ) ii i uq u q τ − ≥     implies the equality of (5).        Q.E.D. 
 
From the specification of  q  , the probability  ( ; ) Dtq   that the bubble has crashed 
at or before any time  [0,1] t∈   is given by 
(; ) 0 Dtq =        i f   0 t τ ≤ <  , 
and 








− =−       i f   1 t τ < ≤  . 




From the specification of  q  , the hazard rate  ( ; ) tq θ   at any time  [0,1] t∈  equals 









     i f   1 t τ < ≤  . 
After the critical time  τ , the time at which the bubble crashes is randomly determined 





. By slightly postponing the time to beat the 
gun from time  i a  to  i a +∆, arbitrageur i  obtains the gain  {1 ( ; )}
i a
ii i eD a q
ρ ρ − −     17














from the decrease in winning probability. Since any time choice is the best response in 
[, 1 ] τ , the above gain and loss must be balanced, which implies the equalities of (7), i.e., 
the first-order condition. 
From the specification of  q  , it follows 
   
() (1 )
exp[ ]


































, which implies that around the critical time  ˆ τ , any rational 

















which implies that as the terminal time 1 is drawing near, any rational arbitrageur is in a 
great hurry to time the market. Hence, the reason why even rational arbitrageurs have 
incentive to ride the bubble is as follows, which bears an analogy to the reputation 
theory in finitely repeated games: 
(i)  As the terminal time 1 is drawing near, any arbitrageur is almost convinced that 
the other arbitrageurs are behavioral. 
(ii)  At any time around the critical time  ˆ τ , any arbitrageur is convinced through his 
rational reasoning that the other arbitrageurs are likely to ride the bubble even if 
they are rational. 
Note that the hazard rate after the critical time  ˆ τ  diverges to infinity as the ratio 





 approaches to unity. Note also that the critical time τ  depends on, not   18
this ratio, but  ( )ln nn ε −  . This implies that the bubble can persist for a long period 
even if all arbitrageurs are almost certain that the bubble will crash just around a 
particular fixed time, i.e.,  τ . 
 
 
5. Hybrid Equilibria 
 
This section specifies another symmetric strategy profile named the hybrid strategy 
profile, according to which any rational arbitrageur sells out at the initial time 0 with a 
probability that is positive, but less than unity. We arbitrarily set a time  ˆ (0,1) τ ∈ , 
where we assume 
(8)    








Let us specify  (0,1) k∈  by 













where the inequality of (8) guarantees  (0,1) k∈ . Associated with  ˆ (0,1) τ ∈ , let us 
specify the hybrid strategy profile 
ˆˆ () ii N qq Q
ττ
∈ = ∈   as follows: for every  iN ∈ , 
ˆ() ii qa k



















   for  all  ˆ [, 1 ] i a τ ∈ , 
where specification (9) of  k  implies 
ˆ ˆ () i kq
τ τ = , i.e., 
ˆ
i q
τ  is continuous. According to 
ˆ q
τ , any rational arbitrageur iN ∈  plans to sell out at the initial time 0 with the   19
probability of  0 k > . With regard to the remaining probability of  10 k − > , the rational 
arbitrageur plans to ride the bubble up to the time  ˆ τ , and he later follows the same 
strategy as the bubble-crash strategy  i q  . The following proposition shows the necessary 
and sufficient condition under which 
ˆ q
τ   is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: The hybrid strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ   is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
(10)    





























−− ∑  










Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
When the hybrid Nash equilibrium is played, the merit from riding the bubble is 
severely limited, i.e., 
ˆˆ () ( 0 , ) ii i uq u q
ττ
− = 1 y < +   must hold, because the time choice of 0 
is a best response. The inequality of  ˆ τ τ >   implies that once the bubble takes off, it 
tends to grow further than the bubble induced by the bubble-crash equilibrium (See 
Figure 4, which illustrates 





From the specification of 
ˆ q
τ , it follows that   20
   
ˆ (1 ˆ )
(; ) 1
n
n nn e Dtq
ρ τ τ ε
−
− =−   and 
ˆ (; ) 0 tq
τ θ =    if  ˆ 0 t τ < < , 
and 




t n nn e Dtq
ρ τ ε
−








 if  ˆ 1 t τ <≤. 
Since the first-order condition is the same between the hybrid equilibrium 
ˆ q
τ  and the 
bubble-crash equilibrium  q   at  any time  ˆ [, 1 ] t τ ∈ , it follows that the associated hazard 
rate is the same between 
ˆ q
τ  and q  , i.e., 









 for  all  ˆ (, 1 ] t τ ∈ . 
The following proposition shows that if the quick-crash equilibrium 
* q  and the 
bubble-crash equilibrium  q    coexist, there also exists  ˆ (, 1 ) τ τ ∈   such that the related 
hybrid strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ   is another Nash equilibrium.
9 
 
Proposition 4: If the inequalities of (1) and (2) hold without equality, then there exists 
ˆ (, 1 ) τ τ ∈   such  that 
ˆ q
τ   is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof: For every  [0,1] h∈ , let us define 
1 () { 1 ( 1 )} { ( ) 1 }
1( 1 )



























−− ∑  









                                                 
9 Proposition 4 does not imply the uniqueness of  ˆ (, 1 ) τ τ ∈  ; the hybrid strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ , 
which is related to this proposition, is a Nash equilibrium.   21
Note that  ( ) B h  is continuous,  (0) 0 B > , and  (1) 0 B < , which imply that there exists 




6. Characterization of Symmetric Nash Equilibria 
 
The following theorem characterizes all symmetric Nash equilibria, which states 
that there exists no other symmetric Nash equilibrium apart from the quick-crash 
equilibrium 




Theorem 5: If any strategy profile  q Q ∈   is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, then either 
* qq = ,qq =  , or 
ˆ qq
τ = , where  ˆ τ  satisfies  (10). 
 
Proof: We set any symmetric Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  arbitrarily, where we assume 
* qq ≠ . We show that  1() q τ  is continuous in [0,1] . Suppose that  1() q τ  is not 
continuous in [0,1] , i.e., there exists  0 τ′>  such that  11 lim ( ) ( ) qq
ττ τ τ
′ ↑
′ < . Since 








 for all  {0,..., 1} ln ∈ − , it follows from the symmetry of 
q that by selecting any time that is slightly earlier than time τ′, any arbitrageur can 
drastically increase the probability of his wining the timing game. This implies that no 




11 max{ (0,1]: ( ) (0)} qq ττ τ =∈ = .   22
We show that  1() q τ  is increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ . Suppose that  1() q τ  is not increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ . From the continuity of  1 q   and the definition of 
1 τ , we can select 
1 ,[ , 1 ] ττ τ ′′ ′ ∈  
such that  τ τ ′′ ′ < ,  11 () () qq τ τ ′′ ′ = , and the time choice  τ′ is a best response. Since no 
arbitrageur selects any time  τ  in ( , ) τ τ ′ ′′ , it follows from the continuity of  q that  by 
selecting time τ′′  instead of τ′, any arbitrageur can increase the winner’s gain from 
ey
ρτ′ +  to ey
ρτ′′ +   without decreasing his wining probability. This is a contradiction. 
Note that any time choice 
1 [, 1 ] ττ ∈  is a best response, because  1() q τ  is 
increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ . This implies the following first-order conditions for all 
1 [, 1 ] ττ ∈ : 
      
11 11
11
(, ) (; ) 1
{1 ( ; )} 0
1
uq d Dq n
eD qe
nd
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− =− , 
where  C  is a positive real number. Since  q is symmetric and continuous, it follows 
that 
(11)     
1 1
11 (1; ) 1 1





− =− =− , 
and 
(12)     
1
1 1





−− =− = . 
From (11), it follows that 
1 1 n Ce
ρ
λ ε
− − = , and therefore, 
(13)     
(1 )
1 1






− =−  for  all 
1 [, 1 ] ττ ∈ . 
 Suppose  1(0) 0 q = . Then, the symmetry of  q implies  11 (0; ) 0 Dq − = , which along 
with (12) and (13) implies 
  








.   23
Hence, it follows from (3) that 
1 τ τ =  , and therefore,  qq = . 
 Suppose  1(0) 0 q > . Let  1(0) kq = . From (12) and (13), 
      
1
() l n ( )










which along with (9) implies 
1 ˆ τ τ = , i.e., 
ˆ qq
τ = . Since 
ˆ qq
τ =  is a Nash equilibrium, 
it follows from Proposition 3 that 
1 ˆ τ τ =   must  satisfy  (10).       Q.E.D. 
 
The outline of this proof is as follows. Fix any symmetric Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  
arbitrarily (see Figure 5, where it was supposed that  ( ; ) Dtq is discontinuous at time 
0 t > ). Note that any arbitrageur can drastically increase his wining probability by 
selling out slightly earlier than time  t, i.e., at time  t −∆. This contradicts the Nash 




See Figure 6, where it was supposed that  ( ; ) Dtq is constant in the interval 
[, ] τ τ ′′ ′ , and the time choice  τ′ is a best response. Since no arbitrageur sells out in the 
interval  (, ) τ τ ′′ ′ , any arbitrageur can increase the winner’s gain from ey
ρτ′ +  to 
ey
ρτ′′ +   without decreasing his wining probability. This contradicts the Nash 
equilibrium property. Hence, it follows that there must exist a time  ˆ τ  such that 
(; ) Dtq is  constant  in  ˆ [0, ] τ , whereas  ( ; ) Dtq  is increasing in  ˆ [, 1 ] τ . 
 
[Figure 6] 
   24
During the interval  ˆ [, 1 ] τ , the first-order condition must hold, i.e., the hazard rate 





 (see Figure 7; it must be noted that 
1 τ τ =   implies qq =  ; 
1 1 τ =  implies 
* qq = ; and 
1 1 ττ <<   implies 
ˆ qq
τ = , where 







In order for either the quick-crash strategy profile 
* q  or the hybrid strategy 
profile 
ˆ q
τ   to be a Nash equilibrium, the time choice of 0 must be a best response. This 
along with Theorem 5 implies that whenever the time choice of 0 is a dominated 
strategy, the bubble-crash strategy profile  q    is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
The following theorem states that the uniqueness holds even if we take all asymmetric 
Nash equilibria into account. 
 
Theorem 6: The bubble-crash strategy profile  q    is the unique Nash equilibrium if 




− > . 
 
Proof: We will show that  q    is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. Note that 






− ′ >  for  all  11 qQ − − ′ ∈ . 
This along with the inequality of (14) implies that the time choice of 0 is dominated by 
the time choice of 1, i.e.,   25
       111 1 (1, ) (0, ) uq uq −− ′′ >  for  all  11 qQ − − ′ ∈ . 
Hence, any symmetric Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  must satisfy  1(0) 0 q = , which along 
with Theorem 5 implies  qq = . Since the inequality of (14) implies the inequality of (2), 
we have proved that  q    is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
  We will show that  q   is the unique Nash equilibrium even if all asymmetric Nash 
equilibria are taken into account. We set any Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  arbitrarily. 
  First, we show that  ( ) i q τ  must be continuous in [0,1] for all iN ∈ . Suppose 
that ( ) i q τ   is not continuous in [0,1] . Then, there exists  0 τ′>  such  that 
lim ( ) ( ) ii qq
ττ τ τ
′ ↑








 for  all 
{0,..., 1} ln ∈− , it follows that any other arbitrageur can drastically increase his winning 
probability by selecting any time that is slightly earlier than time  τ′. Hence, any other 
arbitrageur never selects any time that is either the same as, or slightly later than, the 
time  τ′. This implies that arbitrageur  i can increase the winner’s gain by postponing 
timing the market further without decreasing his winning probability. This is a 
contradiction. 
Second, we show that  (;) Dq τ   must be increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ , where we denote 
  
1 max{ (0,1]: ( ) (0) } ii q q for all i N ττ τ =∈ = ∈ . 
Suppose that  (;) Dq τ   is not increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ . Hence, from the continuity of  q, we 
can select 
1 ,( , 1 ] ττ τ ′′ ′ ∈  such  that τ τ ′ ′′ < ,  (;) (;) DqDq τ τ ′ ′′ = , and the time choice  τ′ 
is a best response for some arbitrageur. Since no arbitrageur selects any time τ  in 
(, ) τ τ ′′ ′ , it follows from the continuity of  q that by selecting time  τ′′  instead of τ′, 
any arbitrageur can increase the winner’s gain from ey
ρτ′ +  to  ey
ρτ′′ +  without 
decreasing his winning probability. This is a contradiction.   26
   Third, we show that  q  must be symmetric. Suppose that  q is  asymmetric.  Since 
the inequality of (14) implies that the time choice of 0 is a dominated strategy, it follows 
1 0 τ > , and 
(15)     ( ) 0 i q τ =  for  all iN ∈  and  all 
1 [0, ] τ τ ∈ . 
Since  q  is continuous and  (;) Dq τ  is increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ , from the supposition 
1 0 τ >  and the equality of (15), it follows that there exist  0 τ′> ,  τ τ ′′ ′ > , and  iN ∈  
such that 
         1() () j qt qt =  for  all  j N ∈  and  all  [0, ] t τ′ ∈ , 
(16)    
(;) (;)
min












 for  all  ( , ) t τ τ ′ ′′ ∈ , 
and 
(17)    
(;) (;)
min 0













where the last inequality was derived from the increasing property of  ( ; ) Dq τ  in 
1 [, 1 ] τ . Since  (;) Dq τ   is increasing in 
1 [, 1 ] τ , any time choice  t in (, ) τ τ ′′ ′   must be a 
best response for any arbitrageur  j N ∈  who  satisfies 
(; ) (; )
min




Dt q Dt q
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, it follows from the continuity of  q that the 
following first-order condition holds for arbitrageur  j ; for every  ( , ) t τ τ ′′ ′ ∈ , 
(, ) (; ) 1
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i.e.,   27

















Hence, from (16), 
      
(; )
1











which implies that the first-order condition does not hold for arbitrageur  i for every 
(, ) t τ τ ′′ ′ ∈ , where 
    
(, ) 1 (; )

















This inequality implies that arbitrageur i prefers time τ′ rather than any time in 
(, ) τ τε ′′ ′ + , and therefore, 








 for  all  ( , ) τ ττ ε ′ ′′ ∈ + , 
where  ε   was positive but close to zero. This is a contradiction, because the inequality 








. Hence, we have proved that any Nash equilibrium  q 
m u s t   b e   s y m m e t r i c .                   Q.E.D. 
 
The brief sketch of this proof is as follows. We can prove the continuity of  q and 
the increasing property of  q  in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 5. In order to 
show that any Nash equilibrium  q  must be symmetric, we have used the inequality of 
(14) as follows. The first-order condition implies 
(18)    
(; )
1










 for  all iN ∈  and  all 
1 [, 1 ] t τ ∈ . 
The inequality of (14) implies 
(19)    
1 ()0 i q τ =  for  all iN ∈ ,   28
which along with (18) implies that  1 i qq =  for all  iN ∈ , i.e., q  is symmetric. 
Without the inequality of (14), however, we may not be able to show this symmetry; we 
may not be able to exclude the possibility that any asymmetric Nash equilibrium  q 
exists, such that 





This paper modeled the stock market as a timing game with incomplete 
information, where it was assumed that each arbitrageur is not necessarily rational, and 
is committed to ride the bubble with a small but positive probability. We showed a 
sufficient condition under which there exists the unique Nash equilibrium, where this 
equilibrium induces the bubble to persist for a long period even if all arbitrageurs are 
rational. We also characterized all symmetric Nash equilibria in general. 
It is important to generalize our model in several directions. For instance, the 
present paper assumed that each arbitrageur has a single share in common. If we drop 
this assumption and permit heterogeneity among arbitrageurs in terms of their 
shareholdings, it might be conjectured that larger shareholders are more likely to insist 
on riding the bubble than smaller ones. This type of interesting but careful analysis is, 
however, beyond the purpose of this paper, and is regarded as a pending problem for 
possible future researches.   29
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
From the specification of 
ˆ q
τ , it follows that 
ˆ (0, ) ii uq
τ
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 if  ˆ [, 1 ] i a τ ∈ . 
Moreover, from the specification of 
ˆ q
τ , 
   





− =− + − −  for  all  ˆ [0, ) t τ ∈ , and 
(A-4)  
1
(1 ) ˆ 1 (; ) 1 ii
n





− =−   for  all  ˆ [, 1 ] t τ ∈ . 
Since  q   is  continuous, 
   
ˆˆ ˆ 1 ˆ (, ) ( , ) { 1 ( 1 )} ( ) 0
i a n
ii i i i uq u a q k e e
ρ ττ ρ τ τε
−
−− −= − − − >  for  all  ˆ (0, ) i a τ ∈ . 
From (A-1) and (A-2), for every  iN ∈  and  every  ˆ (0, ) i a τ ∈ ,   31
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From the equalities of (9) and (10), it follows that for every  iN ∈ , 
ˆˆ ˆ (0, ) ( , ) ii ii uq uq
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where the last equality was derived from (9) and (10). From (A-3), the following 
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where, from (A-4), we have derived 
1 ˆ (1 ) 1 (; ) 1
n














which implies the last equality of (A-5). Hence, 
ˆˆ ˆ (, ) ( , ) ii i i i uq u a q
ττ τ −− =  for  all  ˆ [, 1 ] i a τ ∈ , 
and therefore, we have proved that 
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